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Abstract 
This paper describes an agent-based model of a finite group of agents in a single 
population who each choose which convention to advocate, and which convention to 
practice. Influences or dependencies in agents choice exists in the form of “guru effects” 
and “what others practice”. With payoffs being dependent on cumulative rewards or 
actual standings in society, we illustrate the evolutionary dynamics of the phase structure 
of each group in the population via simulations. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Conventions are usually the behavioural values or norms to which the majority of the 
population, society or community follows, and if a convention is part of a society, usually 
it is to the benefit of its members to conform [1], [2].  Overtime, conventions evolve; 
some goes into conflict, some became stronger, some decay, some may just disappear, 
some may get absorbed by a larger one, or some may even co-exist [2], [10].  
 
Emergence, growth, decay, co-existence, or disappearance of conventions can be due to 
many causes or combinations of factors and influences.  History or path dependence [8] 
and culture [5] could be a major factor.  Technological development [9] may also be one.  
For example, at one time we hear affluence in a community as being attributed with the 
number of coconut trees and monkeys owned.  However, technological breakthrough 
rendered this value obsolete.  Sometimes we have the situation where a community’s 
values and needs are modest, and joining a particular society will then be due to the need 
of being modest –possibly, we then have the case of the frog choosing to jump into the 
pond full of smaller ones [9].   
 
Contrast the above scenario with an example of the subsequent emergence and decay of a 
convention. We have this community whose members are experiencing bigger desires, 
ambitions, or needs.  In the positive stance yes, as members seek to improve their 
individual lot, fair competitive values emerge in their society generating positive welfare 
spillovers  – however when these desires become heinous [6] - we then have the decay of 
the earlier convention. 
 
Lack of knowledge, scared, playing safe for fear of rocking the boat [6] or whatsoever 
reasons may subsequently cause one’s advocate of any particular value or stand to be 
heavily influenced by what others favour in society.  Communal influence or guru effects 
is said to play a significant part in conventional formation. Furthermore we may also 
have occurrences whereby in the zeal of obtaining the end-rewards or payoffs in society, 
the particular values or stand that one adopts may not even be similar to that which is 
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being advocated.  This is the case of where profess and practice seems to belong to two 
entirely different spheres! and we observe the emergence of hypocrisy in the system.   
 
Within the same society we may also have occurrences where the type of convention that 
is being adopted is being influenced not only by the type of convention which others 
practice but also by what others advocate.  It is when a particular society has the above 
three dependencies evolving in their community that forms the framework of this paper.  
The objective of this paper is to model the consequences of these dependencies upon 
agents’ choice, and to illustrate the evolutionary dynamics of the proportions of each 
group via simulation. 
 
 
2. The Model: 
 
We have a society or institution consisting of agents i  who choose which convention to 
favour and which to join.  
 
 
 
A. Choice of Convention to Favour ( f ): In this society, let’s say each agent i  favours 
a convention: ( 1if   ). However, the type of convention which agent i advocates is 
being influenced by the sum of what other agents j advocate i.e. if , is parameterized 
by ijT , the adaptive parameter represents the guru effects or influence of j  on i . We 
have  
  
m
ijT
f
ijTi  j  m  f  m  f  
Figure 1 
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1if   if ij jjT f  [ , ]rand    ,   equals noise level, and rand = random 
number between given limits 
1if   →-1 otherwise 
i.e. Agent i choice is +1 if total influence of j for +1 greater than for -1, and vice-
versa. 
 
The above set-up if  is similar to a Hopfield-like neural network model [7], and is stable 
if ijT  is symmetric. There’s also some possibility of it being chaotic if it is not stable [11]. 
However since if  is stable, we attempt to make the dynamics more interesting by 
differentiating between if  and im . 
 
B. Choice of Convention to Practice ( m ) Each agent i  chooses to practice a 
convention: ( 1im   ). The choice of convention which agent i practice is being 
influenced by the sum of what other agents’ j advocate ( )jf and practice ( )jm .  im  
is therefore parameterized by f
ijT  and 
m
ijT . 
 
1im    if ( )
f m
ij j ij jj
T f T m  [ , ]rand    ,   equals noise level, and rand = 
random number between given limits 
1im    otherwise 
Agent i choice is +1 if total influence of j for ( 1)c   is greater than for -1, and 
vice-versa. 
 
C.  Payoffs 
Each agent earns payoff ( ) ( )i i ip P c P m  for this choice of im  and the cumulative 
payoff of agent i  is given by i i ig g p g   which is a measure of 'standing' in society. 
Furthermore we have payoffs depending also on the amount of agents of good standing: 
  5 
 :( ) i f c iP c g  (sum of standings of those who advocate convention c ). This is  
 normalised and scaled so that ( 1) ( 1) 1P P     
 
Learning – influence matrices are adjusted according to payoffs and gains in 
payoffs use linear Hebb-like [4) learning [3].] 
  
 ( )ij i j iT f f P f   (depends on payoff in advocation) 
 ( ( ) ( ))fij i i i iT m f P m P m    (depends on gain in payoff in practice) 
 ( ( ) ( ))mij i j i iT mm P m P m     
 (  is the learning rate) (all are normalized) 
 
We start the simulation with random initial values 
 
3.  Simulations: 
 
Observe that the dynamics is stable for some choice of parameters. 
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Observe that the dynamics is oscillatory for some choice of parameters. 
 
The system a lot of times freezes into a single convention (despite the existence of the 
opposing view, arising in hypocrisy), but it may also exhibit cyclic behaviour as the 
figures above show. 
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